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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law—Right to Jury Trial—Stockholders' Right to
Jury Trial of Legal Issues in Derivative Suit—Ross v. Bernhard.'—
Petitioners, stockholders of the Lehman Corporation, brought a deriva-
tive action against the directors of the corporation and against Leh-
man Brothers, the corporation's brokers. The petitioners alleged that
the directors of the corporation had wasted its assets through gross
negligence, bad faith, and reckless disregard of their fiduciary duties.
The defendant brokers were accused of controlling the corporation
through an illegally large representation on its board of directors in
violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 2 It was further
alleged that this control had been used to obtain excessive brokerage
commissions from the corporation, and that the contract between the
corporation and its brokers had been breached. The petitioners sought
an accounting and a judgment requiring the defendants to pay to the
corporation their profits and gains and the corporation's losses re-
sulting from the payment of the brokerage fees. Petitioners also de-
manded a jury trial upon the issues presented by the corporation's
claim.
The district court denied defendants' motion to strike the demand
for jury trial and granted an interlocutory appeal on this issue.' The
court of appeals reversed,' holding that a derivative action was equi-
table in nature and that there was no right to a jury trial. On
certiorari,5 the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD:
The right to a jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions
as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right,
would have been entitled to a jury.°
The Ross court was faced with the threshold question of whether
it was proper to characterize a derivative suit in terms of the seventh
amendment's' preservation of the right to jury trial in "Suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars."
This provision has been interpreted as guaranteeing the right of jury
trial only as it existed at the time of the enactment of the seventh
1 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. §* 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
a Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
6 394 U.S. 917 (1969). The Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between
the Second Circuit's opinion and the directly opposite opinion reached by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit
opinion see Note, 49 Cornell L.Q. 665 (1964).
6 396 U.S. at 533.
7 The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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amendment8 on the theory that the passage of the amendment itself
"neither enlarged nor abridged the right of trial by jury."' This right,
as so preserved, has been recognized as one of paramount importance,
any curtailment of which requires scrutiny of the highest degree.'
Application of the seventh amendment's guaranty requires ex-
amination of the nature of the action involved. The derivative suit
was created by equity to enable individual stockholders to enforce the
right of the corporation when those in control of the corporation re-
fuse to act.' Historically, because of its derivative nature, this type
of action was cognizable only in the equity courts and could not be
maintained at law." Because derivative suits have been characterized
as being wholly equitable, they have been outside the protection af-
forded "suits at common law" by the seventh amendment' s The
majority in Ross, however, departed from this strict historical analysis
and viewed the derivative action in a functional context. The majority
viewed the derivative suit as being composed of two claims—the right
of the petitioning stockholders to maintain the action, and the under-
lying corporate claim asserted by the stockholders." It is submitted
that this functional approach is correct, and is supported by the policy
underlying application of the seventh amendment. Furthermore, the
functional analysis used by the majority in Ross is consistent with the
impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon the scope of the
guaranty of jury trial.
The federal courts have consistently followed a liberal policy in
the application of the seventh amendment, that is, courts have been
concerned primarily with the substance of that right rather than with
procedural details." While the enactment of the seventh amendment
preserved existing rights, it was not meant to retain old forms of pro-
cedure' nor to crystalize the development of the common law." Ross
follows this basic policy by focusing upon substance rather than form
in applying the amendment. The petitioners in Ross were procedurally
required to present their claim in the form of an equitable derivative
action. However, the majority looked beyond the form of the action
8 Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. 253, 262 (1855); 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice
§ 38.08[5], at 81-82 (2d ed. 1969).
9 Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713, 716 (D.N.J• 1941).
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433, 445-46 (1830).
11 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855); see Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative
Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 980 (1957).
12 See Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit—Corporate and Individual Grievances, 33
Yale L.J. 580, 582 (1924).
13 Richland V. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
14 396 U.S. at 534-35.
15 Walker v Southern Pac. RR., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
18 Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
42 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 391 (1943).
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and rested its holding upon the legal claim for damages which was
the substance of petitioner's suit's
While the holding in Ross is consistent with the general policy
of the application of the seventh amendment, the specific result
reached is grounded upon the effect of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. With the passage of the Federal Rules, the merger of law
and equity became effective in the federal courts. 2° Since the scope of
the guaranty of the seventh amendment is in part determined by the
equitable or legal nature of a claim, the removal by the Federal Rules
of the distinction between legal and equitable actions bears directly
upon the initial characterization of the mode of trial. However, the
substantive right to trial by jury is expressly left unaffected by the
federal merger of law and equity." The effect of the Federal Rules
upon the seventh amendment is therefore limited to the procedural
aspects of that right. While the right itself is not enlarged or abridged
by the Federal Rules, the procedural access to that right is controlled
by the Rules.
The procedural impact of the merger of law and equity by Fed-
eral Rules has been demonstrated in derivative actions prior to
Ross. In Fleitmann v. Welsbach Co.,22
 a pre-Rules decision, the plain-
tiff stockholder brought a derivative action to recover treble damages
for antitrust violations. The Supreme Court upheld dismissal of the
suit, finding that the Sherman Act22
 "should not be read as attempting
to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict
of a jury in a court of common law." 23 Therefore, the action in Fleit-
mann could not be maintained since it was procedurally impossible in
pre-merger cases to provide for jury trial of legal issues in an equitable
derivative suit.
This same issue was presented after merger in Fanchon & Marco,
Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc." There, the derivative action was al-
lowed, since the procedural impediments found in Fleitmann no longer
existed "in the merged procedure of the present rules.” 25 This new
procedure permitted the assertion of a claim for treble damages in the
derivative suit since
[t]he two major issues of right of the shareholder to sue and
of violation of the antitrust laws causing damage to the
corporation can be tried side by side or otherwise as may
18 396 U.S. at 542.
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 provides: "There shall be one form of action to be known as
`civil action'."
20 The Rules Enabling Act states that these "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right" of any litigant. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
21 240 US. 27 (1916).
22 15 U.S.C. 	 1 et seq. (1964).
23 240 U.S. at 29.
24 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
25 Id. at 735.
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be convenient; that one may go to the jury while the other
causes no difficulty."
The majority in Ross also held that the principal effect of merger
was that purely procedural impediments based upon the distinction
between law and equity were destroyed.' However, the Federal Rules
can be seen as more fundamentally affecting the application of the
seventh amendment in that in some instances merger may operate to
limit the scope of equitable jurisdiction." The basis of equitable jurisdic-
tion is the lack of an adequate remedy at law." In the pre-merger
scheme, once a court of equity had taken jurisdiction of a case, the
equity court could dispose of the entire controversy even though legal
remedies later became available." The basis for this doctrine of equi-
table "clean up" was that subsequent legal action, necessarily in a
separate suit on the law side, would be inadequate relief for the equity
plaintiff because it might not result in orderly settlement of the con-
troversy." However, under a merged system, there is no need to re-
sort to a separate suit on the law side. The later arising legal issue
would be tried to a jury as part of the single unified action. Since this
would result in a fair and orderly resolution of the controversy, the
initial equity plaintiff would be afforded adequate relief.
This elimination by the Federal Rules of the necessity for the
"clean up" doctrine supports the majority holding in Ross. Even if the
majority's view of the derivative suit as being one of a dual nature is
rejected," the legal issues contained in the suit cannot be legitimately
held for purely equitable disposition. Since the merged system pro-
vides an adequate legal determination of these issues in one action,
there is no basis to a denial of jury trial on the grounds that the issues
are contained in an historically equitable suit.
The adoption of a functional rather than an historical approach
by the majority in Ross is further supported by recent decisions inter-
preting the mode of trial by jury under the Federal Rules. In Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,' the plaintiff instituted a declaratory
judgment action in which the defendant raised a legal counterclaim.
The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's request for a jury trial on
the legal issues common to both the request for declaratory relief and
the defendant's counterclaim." In Dairy Queen, Inc. a Wood," the
28 Id.
27 396 U.S. at 539, 540.
28 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
29 Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485, 488 (D. Minn. 1969).
35 American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); McGowan v. Parish,
237 U.S. 285 (1915).
81 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507.
82 See Comment, The Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action,
74 Yale L.J• 725, 729 (1965).
88 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
84 Id. at 504.
85 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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plaintiff, alleging trademark infringement, demanded an injunction
against further infringement, an accounting, and judgment for dam-
ages. The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's demand for a jury
trial holding that where a complaint requested both legal damages and
equitable relief the legal issues are triable by jury as a matter of
right."
The chief significance of Beacon and Dairy Queen has thus far
been seen as the determination of the order of trial of legal and equi-
table claims. In Ross, however, there was no question as to the timing
of the trial of separate claims. Determination of the plaintiff's right
to sue would not operate to bar further determination of the issues of
the defendant's liabilities. The majority in Ross relied on Beacon and
Dairy Queen not to establish an order of trial of several claims, but
to apply seventh amendment protection to the single issue of damages 8T
Moreover, as the dissent in Ross indicated, both Beacon and Dairy
Queen involved claims which were themselves historically separate
actions. The majority in Ross therefore extended the effect of Beacon
and Dairy Queen by applying their holdings to a functional issue—
the underlying corporate claim—for damages which arose in a single,
historically equitable action—the derivative suit. Thus, the impact of
the holding in Ross was to expand the application of the seventh
amendment by focusing upon functional issues as the "unit of treat-
ment's to be used in determining the right to jury trial. While the
language of the opinion still speaks in terms of the dual nature of a
derivative action,n the reasoning of the holding approaches the ques-
tion of right to jury trial in terms of the substantive issue of damages
underlying the controversy and not the historical form of the action.
This interpretation of the right to jury trial in terms of "issues"
rather than "actions" has a basis in decisions prior to Ross. In Beaunit
Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp.,4° the plaintiffs brought an
action requesting a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief relative
to a patent owned by the defendants. The defendants then filed a coun-
terclaim for a judgment declaring the patent valid and infringed. The
Beaunit court held that, although the complaint initially raised only
equitable claims, a jury issue might later develop since "there are no
longer equity cases and law cases, and it is the issues, not the form of
case, which now determine the method of trial.s 41 This same type of
88 Id. at 479.
37 396 U.S. at 542.
38 James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 Yale L.J.
1022 (1936).
89 396 U.S. at 540.
40 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942).
41 Id. at 565-66. The Supreme Court, in 1830, touched on this issue in dictum when
it said:
By common law, [the framers of the seventh amendment] meant what the
constitution denominated in the third article "law;" not merely suits, which
the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in
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functional analysis has been applied to declaratory judgment actions,
with the right to jury trial being accorded "common-law issues?"
despite the fact that the form of the action was itself historically
equitable." Perhaps the strongest indication of this gradual develop-
ment of a functional application of the seventh amendment is found
in Dairy Queen, wherein the Court stated that in determining the
right to jury trial, "[t]here being no question of the timeliness or
correctness of the demand involved here, the sole question which we
must decide is whether the action now pending before the District
Court contains legal issues.""
As has been mentioned," this re-evaluation of the right to jury
trial is consistent with the general policy of the liberal interpretation
of the seventh amendment. The adoption of this functional approach
would also be consistent with the policies of the Federal Rules them-
selves. The Rules emphasize simplification of pleading." Particularly
with respect to the right to jury trial, consideration should be focused
upon the fundamental issues in dispute and "cannot be made to de-
pend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings?'" The func-
tional analysis of the issues presented in a controversy rather than
analysis of the historical method of presentation of the controversy
follows this federal policy of simplification.
The Federal Rules also adopt the policy of attempting to settle
all the claims arising between two litigants in one action." Clearly, a
rule providing for permissive joinder of claims" cannot be expected
to function properly if litigants face the possibility of losing their
right to jury trial as to issues raised in an historically equitable form
of action. By focusing upon the issues themselves, the functional ap-
proach furthers this policy of permissive joinder by respecting the
right to jury trial for each legal issue.
Once the determination has been made that the issue rather than
the form of action is to be considered in questions of the right to jury
trial, the issues must be characterized as either legal or equitable. The
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction
to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
were administered ..
Parsons V. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 432, 446 (1830) (Story, J.).
42 Simler V. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963).
48 E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 399 (2d ed. 1941).
44 369 U.S. at 473. The effect of this language has been interpreted as leading away
from the strict historical analysis of the seventh amendment, but stopping short of the
adoption of a completely functional analysis. Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476, 479
n.5 (5th Cir. 1968).
46 See p. 1017 supra.
46 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
47 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 477, 478 (1962).
48 2B W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practical and Procedure § 873, at 31-32
(Wright ed. 1961).
49 Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) provides in part that "a party asserting a claim to relief
... may join ... as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an
opposing party."
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language of the Rules Enabling Act 5° requires that the distinction
between law and equity abolished by the, Federal Rules is a distinction
in procedure and not in remedies." Use of the remedy requested as
the main indicia of the nature of the issues is a practicable method
of equitable characterization of issues."
The majority in Ross adopted this approach, holding that the
issues of breach of the contract with the corporation's brokers and
negligence by the corporate directors were legal issues, since the relief
sought was money damages." The substantive seventh amendment
right is therefore procedurally extended to those issues involving com-
mon law relief. This functional characterization of issues leaves the tra-
ditionally equitable modes of relief such as injunction and specific
performance within the control of the court. Thus, fears that a liberal
interpretation of Dairy Queen, as was made in Ross, would eradicate
a large area of properly equitable jurisdiction" are unfounded. The
practical effect of allowing legal issues to be tried to a jury and equi-
table issues to the court, regardless of the form of the action, would
not significantly change the distinction between types of relief actually
administered.
The expansion of procedural access to the right of jury trial that is
provided in Ross is grounded upon the policy issue of the desirability
of the use of the mode of trial by jury. The wisdom of the jury system
has been both upheld and attacked by various commentators." A
principal argument for the curtailment of trial by jury is that its ef-
fectiveness as a fact-finder is severely limited in complicated cases.
Derivative suits in particular have been described as involving such
voluminous proof and complicated financial data as to be unwieldy
for jury tria1. 5° The dissent in Ross voiced this basic dissatisfaction
with the use of a jury in derivative actions by describing the result
reached in the majority opinion as "a reflection of an unarticulated
but apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury trials in civil ac-
tions!"67
Fair evaluation of all the objective merits or disadvantages of
5° 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
51 Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Mass. 1939).
52 Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 278 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D. Tex.
1968).
53 396 U.S. at 542. The Court, in a footnote, indicated that the approach to take
in determining whether an issue is legal or equitable is to consider "first, the pre-merger
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries." [Emphasis added] Id. at 535 n.5. However,
in its holding, the Court characterized the claim as legal soley because the "relief sought
[was] money damages." Id. at 542.
54 Comment, supra note 32, 736.
55 For arguments in favor of the use of jury trial, see 1 W. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law 347 (6th ed. 1938); for arguments to the contrary, see J. Frank, Courts
on Trial 110-11 (1949).
50 Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
57 396 U.S. at 551 (dissenting opinion).
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the jury system in general is beyond the scope of this note." Cer-
tainly no attempt is made by the majority in Ross to dispel all doubts
as to the practical efficiency of the use of a jury in derivative suits.
However, the majority holding is clearly in line with the announced
federal policy in favor of granting demands for jury trial in any but
the "most imperative circumstances."" Such circumstances are un-
likely to arise under the liberal procedures for factual findings pro-
vided in the Federal Rules.' Complicated fact situations, as often
arise in derivative actions, can be efficiently handled through the
appointment of special masters"' to aid the jury. In the final analysis,
despite any practical shortcomings of trial by jury, the policy ex-
pressed by the seventh amendment requires that the right to jury
trial be affirmatively supported and accepted with its "mixed bless-
ings."02 The majority decision in Ross lies squarely within this tradi-
tion which acknowledges the fact that if resort must be had to policy,
the policy to be derived from the seventh amendment is in favor of a
jury trial."
In conclusion, the effect of the holding in Ross is to move further
from a strict historical analysis of the right to jury trial toward the
more functional analysis begun in Beacon Theatres and re-emphasized
in Dairy Queen. By focusing upon the underlying legal issues in an
historically equitable derivative action, Ross extends the application of
the right to jury trial. However, the Ross decision deals only with pro-
cedural access to seventh amendment rights, in that it points towards
the use of "issues" rather than "actions" as the unit for determination
of the right to jury trial. The real significance of the decision rests not
in its strained interpretation of a derivative action as having a dual
nature, but in its apparent disapproval of the historical form of action
as the basis for interpretation of the right to jury trial. However, the
retention of the distinction between legal and equitable issues, pre-
serves the courts' control of issues demanding equitable relief. Ross
thus maintains the functional distinction between law and equity in
terms of the seventh amendment while following the established trend
toward procedural expansion of the availability of the right to jury
trial.
RICHARD A. PERRAS
68 The general effectiveness of the jury system is discussed in J. Moore, supra note
8, § 38.02, at 8.
69 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959).
69 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962).
Sr Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.62 See J. Moore, supra note 8, § 38.02[1], at 17.
63 C. Wright, Federal Courts § 92, at 353 (1963).
1023
